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LAWYERS AGAINST THE
EMERGENCY*
STEPHEN ELLMANN* *

For the past four years many South African lawyers have devoted great
effort and ingenuity to the practice of emergency law on behalf of the
victims of the emergency. From the start, this work has had an ironic
quality. Confronting a government armed with legal powers so vast as to
call into question the legitimacy of the law itself, attorneys and advocates
have nonetheless sought to fashion legal limits on the state's authority.
The effort has been difficult, and those who have made the effort,
courageous. Yet it might be argued that this legal struggle has been in
vain, and that, indeed lawyers who have practised in this field have
misdirected their energies. My purpose in this article is to demonstrate
that this argument is mistaken. I will try to explicate a judgment that many

South African lawyers have undoubtedly already made - namely that,
despite the limited legal success which those who represent the victims of
emergency law have had, their efforts have been fruitful as well as noble.I

The case for the practice of emergency law against the state would be
much easier to make if the courts had proved more receptive to lawyers'

efforts to restrain the government's power. Many commentators in this
journal have pointed to the promising decisions of some provincial courts
early in the emergency, but no one now needs to be reminded that under
the leadership of Rabie ACJ the Appellate Division largely dashed the
hopes that those judgments had raised. In the aftermath of Staatspresi-

On 8 June 1990 the nation-wide state of emergency that had been in force from 12 June 1986 came
to an end. This article, which was written while the emergency was in force, is still, however, of
relevance. First, because it raises issues that go beyond emergency law. Secondly because the
emergency continues in Natal (Eds).
BA JD (Harvard), Associate Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. This article owes a great deal
to what I have learned from conversations with many South Africans. I am also grateful to Robert
Andur, Mark Barenberg, George Bizos, Greg Bloche, Geoff Budlender, Edwin Cameron, Arthur
Chaskalson, Stephen Cohen, Lori Damrosch, Jerry Lynch, Eben Moglen, Henry Monaghan, Nancy
Rosenbloom, and Peter Strauss, among others, for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this
piece. Nadine Havenga's translations of Afrikaans legal materials have been essential to my study of
South African law. Columbia Law School and the Parker School of Foreign and Comparative Law
have provided financial support. Responsibility for the arguments and conclusions expressed here,
however, is solely my own.
1 This article is a modified part of a larger project to be published by Oxford University Press, in which
I look closely at critical Appellate Division decisions dealing with the state of emergency before
turning to the present discussion of the role of lawyers.
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dent v United Democratic Front,2 perhaps the most disturbing of these
decisions, Etienne Mureinik wrote that '[m]any of our finest lawyers are
confessing. . .to despondency', though he also maintained that 'despair
3
.. .would be premature'.
Later in this article I will look briefly at the principles of emergency law
that the Rabie Court left as its legacy. We do not need to perform this
examination yet, however, to recognize that South African emergency
law could be worse. We can imagine, or if we wish we can simply read
about, legal systems in which many people are completely - not just
substantially - without hope. During a five-year period of Argentina's
most recent military rule, for example, only a single habeas corpus
petition succeeded out of thousands filed, and that petition dealt with the
case of Jacobo Timerman, by then a focus of sharp international
concern. 4 Moreover, in the cases of those who had not officially been
arrested but instead had 'disappeared', as Alejandro Garro wrote in
1983, '[nlot even one out of the many thousands of petitions for habeas
corpus has succeeded in recovering a missing person alive'. 5 If the efforts
of South African lawyers did no more than to ensure that those held in
detention without trial were periodically heard from in court, the result
would be better than a system in which the same people were never heard
6
from at all.

2 1988 (4) SA 830 (A).
3 E Mureinik 'Pursuing Principle: The Appellate Division and Review Under the State of Emergency'
(1989) 5 SAJHR 60 at 72.
4 A M Garro 'The Role of the Argentine Judiciary in Controlling Governmental Action Under a State
of Siege' (1983) 4 Human Rights LJ 311 at 332.
5 At 335.
6 One argument that could be made against this proposition would be the claim that the very fact that
some constraints apply to the state's lawful powers encourages those who wish to shed those
constraints to resort to bluntly illegal means. In a nation which embraces draconian legal powers in
an effort to avoid the limits of its normal law, those dissatisfied with the efficacy even of emergency
powers may feel that still more drastic steps are called for.
Whether this argument is correct is a complicated empirical question. Constraining the state may
result in an overall increase in human rights protection, at the same time that it encourages limited
vigilante action by a few who resist these constraints. Holding the state to higher standards may result
in no increase in unlawful conduct at all, if efforts are made simultaneously to challenge those who
might choose to act unlawfully. Indeed, loose constraints on official action may coexist with, or even
reinforce, thoroughly lawless behaviour beyond the fringes of the state's structures.
Whatever the cause, in South Africa today there is chilling evidence that repression of
anti-apartheid struggles is not confined to the use of elaborate legal weapons available to the
government, but extends as well to extra-legal methods such as bombings, murders and vigilante
violence. There is also reason for suspicion that the perpetrators of these crimes have links, of greater
or lesser intimacy, with state structures.
Condemning and if possible stopping this extra-legal violence is obviously very important. Even if
the presence of some limits on the state's lawful authority contributed to the rise of this illegal
violence, however, abandoning those limits would be a poor solution to the problem. Such an
abandonment might well give further encouragement to those behind this violence. Moreover, a
country should have neither vigilante violence nor unlawful police action; accepting one to avoid the
other is not a victory. It might be unbearable morally to submit to the latter in order to avoid the
former, even if such a strategy seemed likely to work.
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To say that South African emergency law could be worse, however, is
not necessarily to say that the difference that it makes is so important that
lawyers who seek to challenge apartheid should put their efforts into this
field. Nor, after all, is it self-evident that people who are opposed to
apartheid should put their efforts into legal challenges to the features of
this system, in the field of emergency law or elsewhere. Although the
courts have been more receptive to lawyers' efforts outside the field of
emergency law, it could be argued that even in other fields the ultimate
costs of relying on legal strategies outweigh the gains these strategies may
sometimes bring.
Thus the question of the value of practising emergency law is a subpart
of the question of the value of practising law in South Africa at all. We
might first ask, therefore, whether people opposed to apartheid should
undertake the practice of law of any sort in South Africa. Then, if we
conclude that at least some forms of legal practice do make sense for
opponents of apartheid, we could ask whether the choice to practice in the
field of emergency law rather than in other areas (labour law, for
example) is also a justifiable one.
It seems to me, however, that the arguments for and against any
practice of law in South Africa are broadly similar to those which may be
made with respect to emergency law in particular. In what follows,
accordingly, I will first try to assess the arguments bearing on the practice
of emergency law, on the assumption that a focus on this field will
exemplify the questions bearing on any anti-apartheid lawyer's decision
to practice. I will suggest that emergency law is worth practising, and that,
for roughly the same reasons, many other fields of South African law are
as well. Having reached this broad conclusion, I will look briefly at the
question of whether emergency law is so worthwhile a field that
anti-apartheid lawyers may properly decide to give this field a priority
over other fruitful areas of practice.
Is the practice of emergency law worth the effort? It may seem
presumptuous for anyone, and especially for an American, to offer an
answer to such a question. The question, after all, ultimately calls for an
assessment of the present state and future prospects of South African
society; for a gauging of the strength of the various forces for and against
change in that land; for an understanding of the relation between lawyers'
efforts, in and out of court, and other challenges to apartheid, a relation
that may prove complementary or conflicting; for an understanding of the
alternatives open to those who might undertake emergency law cases;
and for a grasp of what makes difficult and even frustrating work 'worth
it' to an individual. Each of these subsidiary questions is immensely
difficult and some may simply be unanswerable.
Yet the broad question does need to be asked, and answered, South
African lawyers opposed to apartheid, and those of similar conviction
who might become lawyers, have no alternative but to address it.
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Americans concerned about South Africa, I think, are equally without
the option of ignoring this issue, since we must decide whether to support
these efforts, tangibly or morally. If such work is fruitless or even
counterproductive, then we should not aid it; if it is valuable, perhaps we
should aid it more. As individuals, as citizens of South Africa or of the
United States, and in particular as lawyers we must offer the best answer
we can, aware as we will be that our answer cannot resolve all the
7
difficulties that the question presents.
I will attempt to answer this question with two arguments. I will

contend, first, that lawyers cannot simply rely on the fact that the victims
of emergency powers want representation as a sufficient justification for
working on these victims' behalf. Instead, lawyers themselves have an
inescapable responsibility for assessing the value of their work. But I will

maintain, second, that the endorsement reflected in clients' requests for
representation is a well-founded one. Emergency law work, I will try to

show, is of value, both for the benefits it can win for individual clients and
for its broader political impact on South Africa. Let us turn to these
matters now.
I.

LAWYERS' MORAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR WORK

Perhaps we should say that so long as people opposed to apartheid choose
to practise law, they should represent the victims of South African
security powers if the victims want representation. It seems quite clear
that the victims' position is almost always that they wish to have legal
counsel. Exceptions to this generalization exist, but they are few and far
between. Even when those accused of crimes refuse to participate in their
trials as an expression of their rejection of the courts' authority to punish
them, they may choose to continue to receive legal advice. 8 If the victims'
wishes are dispositive, then clearly lawyers should pursue even such
limited victories as this frustrating field of law may permit.
But should lawyers defer to their would-be clients' judgment? I do not

7 Our answer to this broad question may also help us to address other issues, although I doubt that it
will dictate their solution. If American companies doing business in South Africa provide donations
that support anti-apartheid legal work, should calls for divestment be tempered? If South African
lawyers doing such work can find intellectual stimulation and emotional support in American
university communities, should such lawyers be welcomed to American law schools as graduate
students or visiting professors, or should such contacts be proscribed as part of a cultural boycott of
South Africa? Should anti-apartheid South African lawyers be welcome in international fora while
anti-apartheid South African athletes are banned from the Olympic Games? I will not address these
subordinate questions here.
8 In a recent trial, S v MasinaTPD 25 April 1989 Case No cc400/88, unreported, members of Umkhonto
we Sizwe took the position that 'civilian courts' had no authority to try them and 'refused to plead and
participate in the court proceedings'. Nonetheless they were represented by a Johannesburg law firm.
V Gunene 'No Remorse as Delmas Trio Convicted' Weekly Mail 3 March 1989 at 4. Ultimately
evidence in mitigation of sentence in this case was led 'by lawyers instructed by the families of the
accused men'. V Gunene 'Judge Outvoted - So Three Will Hang' Weekly Mail 28 April 1989 at 1.

SOUTH AFRICAN JOURNAL ON HUMAN RIGHTS

mean to ask here whether lawyers have an obligation under South African
rules of professional ethics to accept whoever comes to them as a client
and is able to pay their fee. South African advocates do have such an
obligation, though attorneys in general do not. 9 The cases that come to a
lawyer, however, surely tend to be those in which the lawyer is expert and
interested. This relationship may be especially direct when the cases are
as highly charged as emergency matters can be. Even for those lawyers
subject to the taxi-rank principle, therefore, the question of whether to
defer to potential emergency clients' desire for representation is a live one
- for these lawyers can so structure their practices and careers as to
discourage or instead encourage such cases to arrive in the queue. Hence
it is important for advocates and attorneys alike to consider whether the
value of their efforts in the emergency law field, or in the practice of law
in general, is established by the fact that clients desire and value those
efforts.
To raise this question is not to suggest that clients' wishes are
unimportant to lawyers' obligations. Nonetheless, what clients want is
not necessarily what lawyers must, or even may, do. Let us consider three
respects in which clients' wishes are not altogether dispositive. First,
clients may reasonably desire that their lawyers violate the rules of
professional ethics so as to help the clients win their cases. Clients who
deny the moral legitimacy of the state may find the notion that their cases
should be circumscribed by the same state's ethical prescriptions
particularly implausible. Plainly, however, lawyers opposed to apartheid
and ready to answer clients' calls for representation can be entirely
unwilling to accede to requests for unethical conduct. Such lawyers have
decided, whether for tactical or moral reasons, to offer their clients only
vigorous representation within the law, and to limit their offer of aid in
this way despite the clients' possible desire for less scrupulous
assistance. '0
For any lawyer who adopts this position, clients' wishes are obviously
not wholly determinative. Ultimately such lawyers would need to ask
whether their decision to give representation should be governed by
clients' wishes when their decision as to the type of representation to give
is not entirely left to client direction. I do not mean to explore here what
arguments would explain this seeming disparity in the weight accorded to
9 See, 'Uniform Rules of Professional Ethics of the General Council of the Bar as Adopted by the
Johannesburg Bar', Rule 2.1, in Rules of Professional Ethics of the Johannesburg Bar (May 1986);
E A L Lewis Legal Ethics: A Guide to Professional Conduct for South African Attorneys (1982) 75.
10 Analysis of these reasons is a complex question in itself, and one which this article will not explore.
In discussing the value of legal practice in this article, I mean to argue for the value of a legal practice
that adheres to the normally applicable rules of professional ethics. If the argument set out here is
correct then it would tend to show that the practice of emergency law and of other aspects of
anti-apartheid law in South Africa is a worthwhile enterprise even if on occasion a case that might be
won is lost because of the practitioners' adherence to principles of legal ethics.
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client preference, or to suggest that it is inexplicable. My object is only to
clarify the role that clients' wishes are being assigned.
Second, client wishes - at least conscious, articulated client wishes are not a necessary predicate for lawyers engaging in some aspects of the
practice of law with actual or potential clients. I think that this point holds
true even for lawyers who shape their practice in a quite traditional
manner. Imagine a man in detention who tells his lawyer that he is not
being properly fed. This is an important matter, and the client obviously
wants something done about it. But perhaps the client assumes that
nothing can be done about the sheer fact of his detention, and so makes
no request that the lawyer try to free him from imprisonment. A lawyer
who learns that the client has a valid basis for obtaining his freedom would
be remiss, however, if she did not inform the client of this fact and ask
whether the client wanted her to press this claim. 1' Providing the client
with this information is part of the practice of law, but in this instance it
is not elicited by an express request from the client.
It is fair to respond that the lawyer is acting in light of an understanding,
or assumption, about the client's unexpressed desires, and a reasonable
assumption at that. On this account, the lawyer is not really deviating
from her client's wishes. Once we accept the legitimacy of acting in
accordance with unexpressed, inferred wishes, however, we must also
consider the possibility that the wishes that clients do express are not
those which they would endorse if they were properly counselled and fully
informed.
For example, lawyers consulting with clients in detention might
reasonably assume that many or most of their clients would not want to
engage in court action if that action were likely to provide more benefit
to the government of South Africa than to the clients themselves. On the
basis of this assumption, such lawyers would not regard their clients'
initial expression of a desire to go to court as dispositive. If the lawyers
believed that emergency litigation was ultimately misguided, they could
legitimately argue that it was proper, or even obligatory, for them to
convey their view of the value of emergency litigation to their clients, so
that the clients could decide in light of this advice whether to proceed with
litigation or not. 12 A lawyer of this mind could firmly adhere to the
principle that the client's ultimate, informed choice is controlling - yet
just as firmly assert the propriety of urging the client not to undertake
3
litigation that the client had initially stated a desire to undertake.1

11 In this article I sometimes use masculine pronouns to refer to clients and feminine pronouns to refer
to lawyers. All such pronouns should be understood to encompass people of both sexes.
12 I have argued in an American context that this sort of counselling, if carried out in a nonmanipulative
manner, is part of a practice of law that truly serves client autonomy. See S Ellman 'Lawyers and
Clients' (1987) 34 UCLA LR 717 at 774-8.
13 Even a lawyer dealing with a client who initially expressed a desire precisely to sacrifice the greater
good for his own personal needs would not, on this logic, be constrained to accept. the client's
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Third, in at least one context clients' wishes - even if these wishes are
entirely lawful, and even if they are a necessary predicate for lawyers'
action - cannot be a sufficient predicate for this work. If there are more
potential clients than lawyers have time to represent, then lawyers have
no alternative but to choose which cases they will take. This situation
must exist, at least potentially, for any lawyer contemplating legal work
on behalf of the victims of apartheid in South Africa. Lawyers may have
to choose between deserving cases that arrive simultaneously in their
office. Even more clearly, they must choose over time the sorts of
deserving cases that they will take.
Moreover, anti-apartheid lawyers obviously also have the option to
decide to shape a nonpolitical practice (because, for example, they
believe no good will come from a politically-guided practice, and look on
the law as simply a means of earning a living), and there are no doubt
potential nonpolitical clients who would desire their services as well. In
addition, anti-apartheid lawyers are not forced to be lawyers; they might
decide to forego the practice of law in favour of other forms of work such
as community organizing, for which there surely is also considerable
demand. The magnitude of the need, and the variety of possible
professional responses to it, mean that lawyers in South Africa, and their
supporters abroad, cannot escape the necessity of choice.
II.

THE VALUE OF EMERGENCY LAW WORK

Lawyers might make the choice to reject their would-be clients' requests
for assistance if they believed that the clients were being wrong-headed.
They might reach this judgment on either of two grounds. First, lawyers
might conclude that their clients were mistaken in believing that their
particular cases would fare better with legal assistance than without.
Second, lawyers might maintain that even though their presence would
aid the particular individuals whom they represented, the ultimate effect
of their efforts would be to undercut the broader struggle against
apartheid. I will argue that both of these positions are mistaken. Since
they raise somewhat different considerations, however, I will look at
them separately.
(a) Do emergency lawyers help their clients?

Lawyers would have good reason to grow despairing about the practice of
emergency law if they were unable to help their clients through this
practice. Moreover, it is possible to imagine situations in which lawyers'
instructions without cavil. While still accepting the client's right to make the final decision, the lawyer
might believe that it was entirely proper for her to try to persuade the client that he should become
more altruistic.
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intervention might fail to help, or succeed in harming, their clients'
interests. A lawyer who believes, for instance, that litigation about
allegations of torture will not persuade the courts to grant relief, but may
succeed in further antagonizing abusive law enforcement officers, might
well consider the entire enterprise misguided. Despite the well-known
legal defeats emergency lawyers have suffered in the Appellate Division,
however, I believe the efforts of emergency lawyers overall are far from
14
fruitless.
These efforts remain valuable in part because some of what lawyers do
for their clients can be accomplished without explicit courtroom victories
either in the provincial divisions or on appeal. We can see this even in the
field of emergency detentions, one of the areas in which the state's powers
are at their zenith. As is well known, the Appellate Division decided in
Omar, perhaps the worst of its detention decisions, that the state had the
power to deny detainees access to their counsel.1 5 Yet many, perhaps
almost all, detainees do succeed, often with permission, in obtaining
access to counsel and others in the outside world. This contact is
psychologically important in and of itself.
Moreover, such contacts can lead to litigation. Despite the state's
power under Omar to interfere with detainees' access to lawyers and so
to the courts, cases are brought (and presumably others that are never
brought are threatened) on behalf of detainees. Some of these cases do
result in at least partial victories in court - occasionally even in the
Appellate Division. 16 Perhaps others lead to useful settlements out of
court. Still others, by bringing judicial attention or even newspaper
publicity to bear, may help constrain officials who never are subjected to
an actual judgment or settlement binding them. All of them help ensure
that detainees do not disappear.
I think that even though the cases in which courts will grant relief will
be few, and even though the broad contours of the emergency system will
unquestionably be left intact, the potential for a constant legal war of
attrition is a significant check on the worst potentials under the states of
emergency. 17 In such a context, valuable results may be achieved even
though the broad brush with which the Appellate Division paints has been

14 1do not mean to suggest that there are no fruitless cases in the emergency law field. Rather, my point
is that there are many fruitful ones.
15 Omar v Minister of Law and Order 1987 (3) SA 859 (A).
16 See Nkwentsha v Minister of Law and Order 1988 (3) SA 99 (A); Apeteni and Lamani v Minister of
Law and Order 1989 (1) SA 195 (A).
17 An illustration from outside South Africa of the impact that determined lawyers may have on the
working of a legal system is the continuing effort to combat capital punishment in the state and federal
courts of the United States. As of August 1989, this effort has held the number of executions to less
than 120 over the period of more than 13 years that has passed since the Supreme Court ruled in 1976
that the death penalty was not per se unconstitutional. This success has been achieved despite the
broad popularity of capital punishment in the United States today and despite the presence of
thousands of convicted men and women on death rows around the nation.
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increasingly grimly hued. I suspect, too, that even though the Appellate
Division has rejected many of the legal initiatives of lower courts in
emergency cases, the lower court decisions have somewhat tempered
some of the worst steps the government sought to take - a tempering that
makes the Appellate Division's lack of vigilance less immediately
damaging.
When we measure what is to be gained in these cases, moreover, we
need to remember the possibility of change in the courts' performance.
Obviously change can be for better and for worse, but there are at least
three reasons for a modest optimism about future trends in the Appellate
Division.
The first is that Acting Chief Justice Rabie has at long last been
replaced by Chief Justice Corbett, a judge thought to be of less
'executive-minded' views. While we should be careful not to exaggerate
the power of a single judge, South Africa's Chief Justice appears to wield
very significant authority, if not sole control, over the selection of the
judges who will hear cases. 18 Corbett CJ can make a difference to future
judgments merely by ensuring that the selection of courts is more
representative of the Appellate Division as a whole than those of the
recent past have been. 19 He may also, of course, enjoy intellectual
influence on his colleagues on the bench. The Appellate Division's recent
decision to overturn an emergency restriction order as so 'manifestly
extravagant' that it was 'legally impeachable in its entirety' offers some
20
confirmation of the hopes for the Corbett Court.
A second reason is that despite the decisions of the Rabie Court South
African law continues to provide the theoretical foundation for decisions
protecting human rights. It is true that Rabie's service as Acting Chief
Justice enabled the government to secure additional years in which the
Appellate Division was headed by a justice to its liking. It may also be the
case that Rabie sought to bind future judges of the Appellate Division as
firmly as possible with the ties of stare decisis. Haysom and Plasket have
argued in these pages that '[i]t
is difficult to imagine how even a
reconstituted Appellate Division could rescue our system of administrative law from the treatment it has received at the hands of the Rabie Court
18 This power appears to be more de facto than de jure. Section 12 of the Supreme Court Act 59 of 1959
explicitly gives the Chief Justice certain powers to determine the number of judges who will hear a
case, but does not assign to the Chief Justice or to anyone else the power to select the judges.
19 For an analysis of the composition of the Appellate Division panels that heard security law cases from
1987 to 1989, see N Haysom and C Plasket 'The War Against Law: Judicial Activism and the
Appellate Division' (1988) 4 SAJHR 303 at 309-10. Haysom and Plasket comment that 'Rabie ACJ
must, we assume, bear some responsibility for the composition of the courts which hear security
related matters' at 310.
20 For a brief description of this case, Visagie v State President, see Human Rights Commission Human
Rights Update:April -June 1989 at 1 (July 1989), G Davis 'Judge Hands Down a Legal 'Crumb' to
SA's Restricted 900' Weekly Mail 30 June 1989 at 2.
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-unless such a court were to be as creative in the face of recent precedent
21
as the Rabie Court has been in the face of older precedent'.
There is much to be said for just such judicial creativity in favorem
libertatis in South Africa today. In many respects, moreover, the more
benign doctrines of South African law, in Mureinik's words, 'have a great
deal of resilience left in them yet'. 22 By and large the South African courts
remain open, and access to them has been protected in such decisions as
Nkwentsha and Apeleni. Most legally cognizable claims - though after
Staatspresidentv United DemocraticFront not all - may still be heard.
Even decisions that have seriously undercut human rights have often
done so more by manipulation than by transformation of existing
doctrine. Dempsey, for example, does not abrogate the 'apply the mind'
doctrine applicable to official action, though it weakens the force of this
requirement significantly. 23 Omar accepts various standard principles of
the review of subordinate legislation, though it applies to them
halfheartedly at best. Staatspresident v United Democratic Front's
validation of statutory ouster of jurisdiction over a vagueness claim is
perhaps the sharpest deviation from prior trends, but doctrinally there is
less even to this case than meets the eye. The arguments that Rabie ACJ
and Hefer JA offer to support this ouster are so logically unsatisfactory
that it can still be argued that no other challenges should be subject to
ouster. In fact, both these judgments suggest other grounds for review
that would not be ousted. Meanwhile, they remind readers that vague
regulations remain unenforceable even if they cannot be declared
invalid.24
It is worth asking why the Rabie court did not make sharper revisions
in the doctrines which it addressed. Perhaps the court simply did not need
to do more than it did in order to decide cases for the government - and
would and could have done more if the occasion had arisen. Perhaps the
court also found the sheer weight of doctrine and precedent too great to
alter quickly. The density of the law, on this account, gives it some
durability. I suspect that there is another reason as well. This reason is
that the court, even under Rabie, may have been reluctant to modify
existing doctrine. Rabie, after all, was the author of Hurley25 and of
Nkondo & Gumede26 as well as of Omar and Staatspresident v United
DemocraticFront. At his best, Rabie was never a human rights advocate,
but it seems possible that he and some of his colleagues saw themselves
21 Haysom and Plasket op cit note 19 at 305.
22 Mureinik op cit note 3 at 72.
23 Minister of Law and Order v Dempsey 1988 (3) SA 19 (A).
24 The observations concerning the case law here reflect the results of the analysis of these cases in the
larger project of which this article is a part.
25 Minister of Law and Order v Hurley 1986 (3) SA 568 (A).
26 Nkondo & Gumede v Minister of Law and Order 1986 (2) SA 756 (A).
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as restricting South Africans' legal rights only because the protection of
the security system seemed to demand such change. Dismayed themselves by the necessity they perceived, these judges may have been less
eager, perhaps even less able, to formulate the doctrinal basis for sharper
shifts in the law.
That South African law may have been hard to change, and that judges
deeply concerned with state security may not have relished the process of
changing it, are reasons to hope that the fabric of the law will not be easy
to tear even if the leadership of the court shifts again. In any event, for
now the underlying principles have proved to have some durability.
Future panels of the Appellate Division and of the provincial divisions
still have significant discretion to vindicate human rights claims.
The third reason for optimism is that of the present political climate of
the country as a whole. To say that the courts are affected by the political
climate does not require any 'conspiracy theory' of the appointment and
behaviour of South African judges. It is in fact quite startling to a foreign
observer to see how many firm opponents of government policies have
been appointed to the Supreme Court bench by the National Party
government. Their presence and their impact suggest that here, too, the
traditions of the legal system are remarkably resilient. The willingness of
some less notably liberal judges to render decisions against the state is
27
further evidence of the same point.
Still judges are appointed by the government, and it is safe to assume
that politics affect the appointment process. Some members of the bar
may be unwilling to be appointed by a government that they abhor; the
government may also be reluctant to appoint those lawyers of whom it
deeply disapproves; and on occasion the government has appeared to
manipulate the appointment process so as to give special advancement to
individuals whom it favoured. In these and probably other ways, politics
can directly affect the composition of the bench. Even where none of
these factors operates, all members of the judiciary come from a
privileged, often extremely privileged, sector of the South African
society. This background in turn must influence the views of those who
come to sit on the bench.
It is reasonable to expect that judges who perceive that those with
whom they share beliefs or backgrounds are revising their judgments
about security issues will not be wholly indifferent to this development.
As I write in October, 1989, the government appears to be eager to
demonstrate a receptivity to substantive change. Perhaps more important, the government has been opening up the channels of nonviolent
political protest, and even speaks of lifting the state of emergency at least
in part (though the number of emergency detainees has also been rising
27 The judgment of Rumpff CJ in Komani NO v Bantu Affairs Administration Board, Peninsula Area
1980 (4) SA 448 (A) is a particularly striking example.
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again). If the government truly embraces this course, we can expect
judicial antennae to pick up the new direction. The government itself may
make less aggressive use of emergency powers even if it retains the state
of emergency. As a result, the Appellate Division may experience fewer
occasions when it is urged to render executive-minded decisions, and may
view such urging as it does receive with greater scepticism than did the
Rabie court.
The upshot of this analysis is that clients' apparent belief that their
individual interests will be served by having legal representation is
correct. Their fates will be less grim if they have the aid of lawyers. And
this effect will not be confined to the particular clients alone, for the
protections that lawyers establish in any one case may shield other South
Africans thereafter. Nonetheless it is possible to argue that these gains are
outweighed politically by losses generated through the very process of
pursuing relief within the existing legal structures. Let us now consider
this political attack on the value of lawyers' work.
(b) Do emergency lawyers undercut the struggle against apartheid?
It can be argued that the best way to undercut apartheid is to reject it at
every turn. For those who encounter the system of apartheid through
South Africa's courts, the correct response would be to refuse to
participate in the system's legal forms. Opponents of apartheid would
seek to manifest the illegitimate character of the power that oppressed
them by their refusal to participate.
A broad principle of non-participation is, in fact, the theory that guides
much of black political life in South Africa today. 28 When Africans
choose not to vote in segregated municipal elections - the only occasions
on which South Africa accords them a right to vote outside their
'homelands' - they are seeking to undermine a structure of apartheid,
rather than risk lending it legitimacy by their very participation. When
other South Africans boycott Parliamentary elections, they are doing the
same thing. The price of such boycotts is that a modicum of power falls
into the hands of those blacks who for ideological or personal reasons are
prepared to play the game, but that is a price that other blacks have been
prepared to pay. In a similar vein, it could be argued that blacks and
whites would be wise to turn away from the use of the law and of litigation
altogether, even at the risk of personal suffering as the immediate result,
for the sake of longer-term objectives.
The practice of those subjected to emergency powers appears to reflect
their refusal to take this step. Perhaps, however, a sympathetic lawyer
could conclude that this refusal is a mistake. Should a sympathetic lawyer

28 This theory by no means governs all of the fields of popular struggle in South Africa, as the rise of
black labour unions reflects.
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substitute her judgment for that of the would-be clients, by refusing to
take their cases? There would be two reasons not to adopt such a stance.
The first would be a hesitation on the part of the lawyer to adopt the role
of political activist and decision-maker; the second would be a judgment
that the decisions to seek legal representation that clients have made are
justified on political as well as individual grounds. I will argue that
anti-apartheid lawyers do not have to be activists, but that even so they
cannot avoid making some political choices. I will also suggest that
lawyers' work should, on balance, be politically valuable rather than
damaging.
Should anti-apartheid lawyers be political activists first and foremost?
A lawyer who has chosen to focus part or all of her professional life on
attempting to limit the depredations of apartheid is not a person who has
excluded political and moral judgments from her field of responsibility.
Perhaps such lawyers should take their principles one step further, and
assert that it is their responsibility, rather than anyone else's, to decide
which cases are so politically and morally productive that the lawyers
should undertake them. Such lawyers might see themselves, and present
themselves to the world, as activists first and lawyers second - the stance
29
Cyril Ramaphosa has reportedly urged lawyers to adopt.
This stance can be an admirable one. South Africa presents us with
distinguished examples of lawyers who have indeed become 'activists
first' - Nelson Mandela and Abram Fischer among them. But
conscientious anti-apartheid lawyers are not, I submit, obliged to see
themselves as activists. They might feel, for example, that their
professional standing with their peers, on which their effectiveness as
lawyers depends, rests on their being, visibly, 'lawyers first and activists
second'. Or they might feel that their effectiveness with their clients
depends on their retaining the capacity for objectivity that lawyers
practise but activists may not prize. Or they might feel that they are better
lawyers or better people as lawyers, than they would be if they tried to
play an activist role for which they are not well suited. On any of these
grounds, and no doubt more, men and women can properly conclude that
it is their responsibility to serve as lawyers rather than to become activists
themselves.
I have already suggested, however, that no lawyer in South Africa can
escape the responsibility for choosing which case, out of the many
possible ones, to undertake. A lawyer indifferent to political matters
might choose cases based on the fees they brought in, and as a practical
matter even a lawyer committed to the struggle against apartheid cannot
wholly ignore this criterion. (This reality underlines the importance of the
29 G Davis 'Lawyers Group Calls for "isolation" of Bar Councils' Weekly Mail 27 May 1988 at 8. I do
not mean to suggest that Ramaphosa necessarily intended to support the conception of lawyers'
responsibility that I sketched in the text. A call for lawyers to be activists first can be interpreted in
a wide variety of ways.
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political and moral criteria applied by those who assist in funding these
lawyers.) Where money and other nonpolitical concerns - 'gaining
experience', 'handling interesting matters' and the like - are not
dispositive, however, I see no way for lawyers to make their decisions
except by applying some political or moral standards. It may be quite
legitimate for lawyers to borrow those standards, for example by
adhering to a principle of 'taking cases identified as important by
representative popular organizations'. At the least, however, the lawyer
must choose to do the borrowing, and is responsible for this choice.
What if the lawyer did take the 'activist first' course? Lawyers who
become activists first may conclude that they must make detailed
judgments about their professional lives based on political principle.
(Non-activists might reach the same conclusion.) Such lawyers might
conclude as a matter of politics that participation in the legal system is a
mistake, and that the contrary view of the majority of other victims does
not bind them to join in that mistake. Many activists might nonetheless
believe that so long as the people with whom they work hold onto the idea
of legal representation, it is not the activists' place to deny them access to
counsel. Presumably, however, activists who believe that lawyers' work
ultimately does more harm than good will at least try to lead the people
as a whole to share that view.
But is it a political mistake to participate in the legal system? We have
already seen that such participation can somewhat lessen the impact that
the state's emergency apparatus will have on its individual victims. But
this immediate boon can have political value as well. The harder it is for
the state to punish or coerce any given individual, after all, the easier it
is for that individual to continue to play a role in the political struggle. The
broader these ripple effects become, the more lawyers' work serves not
only to safeguard individual South Africans but also to help provide
'space' for the political movements of which these individuals may be a
part.
Moreover, the targets of emergency law are by no means limited to
individuals. When the state seeks to muzzle free reporting by the press,
or to clamp down on the activities of an anti-apartheid organization, any
successful challenges to the state's designs obviously may effect the
broader course of change. It would be a mistake to overstate the victories
that can be won on these fronts, for extensive media controls have been
imposed and many anti-apartheid organizations deprived of their legal
right to carry on any activities whatsoever. Yet lawyers may have had
some successes all the same, for example in limiting the state's efforts to
ban alternative newspapers, or in securing some legal room for events
such as the Mandela birthday celebrations of 1988 or the beach
demonstrations of 1989.
Perhaps an example, not from emergency law but from nearby, will
confirm this point. Late in 1988 five men were sentenced to lengthy
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prison terms at the end of the 'Delmas' treason trial. In that case more
than 400 days of trial were taken up with an examination of the actions of
the individuals actually facing charges in the case and of countless others
not before the court - in a sense, the entire society. That only four of the
accused ultimately were sentenced to imprisonment is a partial, bittersweet victory for the accused, and for their lawyers.*
But a greater victory may also have been won. The massive defence
mounted on behalf of the 22 people indicated in this case (and similar
efforts in other recent treason cases) may have slowed the march of
government repression of the national resistance that sprang up in the
mid-1980s, for this work helped to deprive the government not only of
convictions but also of the imprimatur for broader oppression which a
quick and easy conviction of leading activists for treason could have
provided. Denied this weapon for a time, the government found another
device in early 1988 in the effective banning of the United Democratic
Front under the emergency. 30 Yet some precious time had perhaps
already been won, for it may be that organized opposition to apartheid
would have been even more bluntly and thoroughly suppressed had it
been easy, rather than difficult, for the state to run its opponents through
the gauntlet of a treason trial.
Still, even after generously measuring the individual and political value
of emergency law work, we should also ask whether its costs might
outweigh its value. In making such an evaluation, lawyers (whether
activists or not) might well hesitate to sacrifice relatively tangible benefits
to clients and others in light of costs that might be less certain or less
immediate. But we could hardly rule out a priori the possibility that some
lawyers might find, perhaps correctly, that these costs were too much to
31
pay.

Let us consider two types of potential costs. First, a focus on legal
protections might divert activists and potential activists from more
fruitful forms of activity. After all, if it is clear that the courts are unlikely
to alter the fundamental contours of the state's security system, then
perhaps those who oppose that system should look for alternative means
of challenging it.
This argument starts from a somewhat mistaken premise, namely that
legal work and political work are mutually exclusive alternatives. We
have just seen one reason that this premise is misleading - that in fact
legal work may sustain and protect political efforts. It is not misleading,
however, to recognize that legal work might come to enjoy a reputation
for efficacy that it did not deserve. The work of lawyers might as a result
30 GN 334 GG 24 11157 24 February 1988.
31 Whether those who speak for the oppressed, in political fora or in courts, have an obligation not to
deprive their people of attainable benefits despite possible long-term costs is an issue beyond the
scope of this article. See M Walzer Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship (1970)
46-70.
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attain a cachet that exalted its importance above that of the political
campaigns it might seek to benefit, or even encouraged people to
dispense with political organizing in favour of litigation.
The significance of this possibility can only be measured empirically.
An activist lawyer might ask whether there exist other means of aiding
political struggle which promise greater success at this time - and might
find, regretfully, that under a state of emergency the work of lawyers
ranks quite highly in terms of its effectiveness among the courses of action
available. An activist might also ask whether those who might undertake
more political forms of protest in fact lapse into quiescence because of the
availability of courtroom challenges. It may be that such misplaced
dependence on the law can develop, and so should be a matter of concern
in framing tactics in any particular situation. Lawyers may be able to
minimize this danger without departing the field altogether, if they shape
32
their relations with their clients in light of a recognition of this potential.
More broadly, however, the history of the past decade is a history of mass
mobilization as well as widespread litigation, and it is simply difficult to
see in that history any evidence of a general tendency on the part of South
Africa's oppressed majority to forego political challenge for judicial
disquisition.
The view that legal work undercuts political work also seems to entail
a relatively narrow definition of 'legal work'. Much of what lawyers do is
of course in courts or similar professional settings, and thus could pose the
risk of impairing mass mobilization discussed above. But not all that
lawyers do is so narrowly confined. Consider, for example, the fast
undertaken by lawyers for emergency detainees in support of the
detained hunger strikers. 33 It may seem odd to describe this fast as a form
of lawyers' work. Even if the fast itself was not part of the practice of
emergency law, however, the fact that the fasters were lawyers was part
of what made the fast a noteworthy symbolic gesture, and so the lawyers'
professional status directly supported this arguably extra-professional
conduct.
In any case, less vivid forms of political work have long been recognized
as within the sphere of lawyers' professional obligations. Lawyers as a
profession, in the bar councils and law societies, can legitimately decry
unjust laws and work for their reform. Two South African organizations,
Lawyers for Human Rights and the Society for the Abolition of the Death
Penalty in South Africa (at least some of whose members are lawyers),
have recently pressed the case against South Africa's death penalty. Brian
Currin, one of the leaders of this effort, has said that he is 'convinced that
the lobbying in high places, our execution monitoring programme and the
32 For an insightful description and analysis of the efforts of alawyer and a community organizer to avoid
such unfortunate results see L E White, 'To Learn and Teach: Lessons from Driefontein on
Lawyering and Power' 1988 Wisconsin LR 699.
33 See 'Strikers Spark New Spirit in South Africa' 31 Africa News (No 4) 20 February 1989 at 2.
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high profile campaigns have together contributed towards the realization
in government circles that something needed to be done'. 3 4 The risk that
lawyers' work will undermine political efforts declines the more their
work is understood to include political efforts. (The more laywers
undertake political struggle, however, the less they can limit their
responsibility for political choice, for as participants in politics they run
the risk that one political effort, or strategy, will undercut another.)
A second possible political cost of a focus on legal protections could be
the legitimation of the courts, and by extension the government of which
the courts are a part. The better lawyers do in their use of the rules of the
game - the more useful they are to the individual clients - the more they
may, according to this argument, tend to strengthen support for the
current regime and to deflate opposition to it. We might take the fact that
opponents of oppression in a wide range of countries have attempted to
invoke the law as a sword or shield on their behalf as some evidence that
those closest to these questions do not usually see the risk of legitimation
as a dispositive one. Even if this risk is usually not prohibitively severe,
however, it might be so in South Africa. In assessing it, we must
remember the various audiences before whom these events are played
out. Let us consider three different audiences, beginning with the
audience perhaps most easily persuaded of the legitimacy of South
African instutitions- South African whites- and then briefly discussing
the audience outside South Africa before looking in more detail at the
possible impact on the largest audience in South Africa itself - South
African blacks.
South Africa's whites, or at least many of them, appear to place real
value on their society's adherence to law. The extraordinary elaboration
of security and emergency laws, marking out in immense detail the state's
sweeping powers, itself reflects this attachment. Praise of the quality of
the South African judiciary can bespeak the same feeling. 35 The roots of
this sentiment are complex. They may range from genuine attachment to
the idea of the rule of law, to pragmatic recognition of law's efficacy as a
tool of social control, to anxious concern for the opinions of other
Western nations whose attachment to government by law may be more
intense. For such reasons as these, in any event, it may be important to
white South Africans' continued support of the government's overall
direction that they be able to feel that their society lives by the law. That
feeling may be easier to summon up if even the emergency is seen to be
grist for lawyers' mill - and easier still if lawyers win an occasional
victory.
Thus in this respect lawyers' work may bolster the state. I suspect,
34 G Evans 'Turnabout welcomed as number of hangings declines' Weekly Mail 3 March 1989, at 3.
35 See C J Claassen 'Retain the Bar and Side Bar' (1970) 87 SALJ 25. ('1 am told on good authority that
the English judges, who are undoubtedly the most eminent judges in the world, consider only the
South African judges as their equals.')
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however, that this almost paradoxical result of lawyers' challenges to
state conduct should not be of great concern to the lawyer weighing the
political consequences of her work. Most whites are not, unfortunately,
profoundly opposed to the present order in South Africa, nor are they the
primary engine of political pressure for change. As a result, confirming
their support for the current regime probably does not sharply alter the
present political equation.
This is not to say that whites' views are irrelevant. If whites' confidence
in their own institutions were to decline, that might significantly affect the
course of events in South Africa. It is possible that the legitimizing effects
of emergency law practice help stave off such a decline. But is it really
likely? We may well question whether the existence of emergency law
practice (or anti-apartheid practice generally) does greatly affect whites'
views on whether their society is ruled by law. To be sure, the visible
evidence of this practice - the reports of court cases, the statements by
lawyers - receives attention in the press, an attention magnified by the
fact that court proceedings can be reported much more freely than many
events 'on the street'.
Developments in the courts, however, are only a small part of the
political and social scene in South Africa. Troop movements, unrest
reports, debates in Parliament, and televised accounts of these eventsall of these probably form the bulk of the information that South African
whites look to in their daily experience of their society. It seems quite
possible that if there were no lawyers assisting the victims of apartheid,
most whites would still be prone to believe that their society adhered to
the law.
Moreover, emergency law work has a distinct defect as a source of
legitimation even in the eyes of whites, since such work is by definition
focused (on the victims' part) on displaying and condemning the
injustices of the existing order. Perhaps even many whites find the reports
of such litigation more disturbing than reassuring.
Before considering whether lawyers' work legitimizes the South
African government in the eyes of blacks, let us consider briefly its effects
on the views of people outside South Africa. It is difficult, of course, to
do more than speculate about such effects. Undoubtedly some foreign
observers sympathize deeply with South African whites, and might
respond to emergency law practice as most of those whites would. I
suspect, however, that for most foreign watchers the question is not
whether the existing order is a legitimate one, but rather how to
encourage it to change. In that case the existence of emergency law
practice may well affect their assessment of strategies for bringing about
such change - and an activist lawyer in South Africa might worry that
outsiders would overestimate the utility of the courts - but their
perception of the legitimacy, or rather illegitimacy, of most aspects of the
system would not be at issue. If anything, news reports of court action
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might remind outsiders of the state of affairs in South Africa and thus
confirm their sense of the illegitimacy of the existing order.
The risk that outsiders may overestimate the utility of legal practice
could be a serious concern, but I am inclined to doubt that in fact it
currently should be. If the use of the courts and the law is one valuable
part of the effort to challenge apartheid, then (given the reality of
limitations on the amount of foreign support available at all) it seems
unlikely that the result of an overestimation of the value of this strategy
will be an absolute 'over-funding' of this effort, in terms of financial or
moral support.
It is true that this effort might still be overfunded relative to other
deserving candidates for assistance. Even if legal work is receiving a
disproportionate share of foreign support, however, a decline in support
for this work might not translate into an equivalent increase in assistance
to other activities. This could be the case, for example, if those who
support the work of lawyers and those who support different strategies,
such as union organizing, constitute relatively distinct and non-overlapping groups, whose members do not readily adopt new targets for their
aid. Moreover, I doubt that a survey of foreign support for anti-apartheid
efforts would actually show anything like a singleminded focus on the
activities of lawyers. The possible misdirection of foreign support, in
short, does not seem to be an acute concern.
To suggest, finally, that the effect of emergency law practice is to
legitimize the system in the eyes of South African blacks is simply
implausible. South Africa today is not a state in which the black majority
accepts the legitimacy of its white rulers' dominance. It is wholly unlikely
that the partial checks on that dominance that emergency litigation can
achieve will confer an aura of virtue on the government as a whole. That
the police can be stopped does not necessarily mean they should be
praised!36

A narrower version of this argument, however, may be more credible.
If people go to court and win some relief, is it not possible that they will
conclude that the courts - the Supreme Courts, in particular - deserve
more respect than the rest of the current system? Is it not possible that
South African blacks might entertain the view that 'justice' is available,
at least some of the time, in these courts?
We should not overstate the likelihood that emergency law work will
produce this result, given its focus on some of the worst features of the
existing order and given its decidedly modest level of success. We should
also remember that lawyers' work broadly understood can include
political gestures meant to counter the subliminal legitimation that
conceivably is the result of even unsuccessful efforts in court. The fasting
36 See A Sachs Justice in South Africa (1973) 202.
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lawyers' declaration that the courts had failed their detainee clients is such
a gesture.
A precisely targetted boycott might be another. 37 Obviously such a step
could have costs in terms of whatever chance of legal relief was foregone
as a result. But these costs would by no means be as severe as the costs of
foregoing all legal remedies indefinitely in a general boycott would be.
Moreover, unlike a total boycott - a gesture that would surely have more
delegitimizing impact but that seems wholly unlikely at this time narrowly focused refusals to invoke legal procedures might be organiza38
tionally feasible.
Let us grant, nonetheless, that it is possible that blacks might conclude
as a result of judicial victories that justice can sometimes be won in the
courts. Then we might say that emergency law practice can legitimize the
courts in the eyes of blacks, to the extent that the courts are seen as
providing fair results or, failing that, at least fair process. Whether South
African blacks do give the courts a greater measure of legitimacy than
they accord to other institutions of the government is not entirely clear,
but let us assume for argument that they do. If emergency law practice
contributes to this attitude, should we count this effect as a cost of
practice?
If South Africa's Supreme Court generally is an institution in which
honest judges seek to act fairly, and are prepared on occasion to follow
their convictions or the law's dictates even to the extent of opposing, in
some measure, the worst excesses of the government, it would seem that
these virtues should be recognized by blacks just as by other opponents
of apartheid (although they should not be exaggerated). To say that they
should not be recognized would be to say that people should remain
ignorant of such bright spots as the South African system presents - a
view that could be held but that does not reflect great respect for the
judgment of those to be kept in ignorance.
There is, in addition, a political reason for holding that it is extremely
important that the relative independence of the South African courts be
widely seen, and by both blacks and whites. That reason is that the
attitude of South Africa's people towards the courts now will influence
their attitude towards courts in the future. It was possible for American
colonists to hate the British monarchy and yet retain much of British law.
It seems equally appropriate for South African citizens to hate the system
of apartheid but retain in the future the beneficent principles of the
37 The reported one-month boycott of Israeli military courts by Palestinian lawyers would be an example
of such a focused boycott. See 'Palestinian lawyers boycott courts' The Guardian 3 January 1989
at 7.
38 So long as such a boycott was carried out with the consent of the clients in question, I assume it would
violate no rules of South African legal ethics or law. It is not the purpose of this article to urge any
unlawful conduct by lawyers - nor, indeed, to do more than recognize the potential availability of
the boycott device as an element in lawyers' work. Assuming the tactic is available, its effectiveness
would remain to be considered.
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common law that still inhere within the South African legal system, and
the welcome tradition of judicial independence that also still holds
meaning. It is impossible to predict, of course, what the impact of current
judicial decisions or of their public reception will be on the character of
South Africa's government after apartheid. Nonetheless it makes sense to
expect that the more reality lawyers can give to the highest aspirations of
the law now, the stronger the appeal of these ideas will be to the citizens
of a future South Africa. In this respect, then, a qualified legitimation of
the courts through emergency law work would be, in political terms, a
benefit rather than a cost of this enterprise.
To this political benefit we should add another that we have not yet
assayed. It is possible that the courts will have a valuable political role to
play along the road to a future South Africa as well as when the journey
is complete. We cannot know the course by which apartheid may be
brought to an end, although it is clear that important forces within (and
without) South Africa, both black and white, are pressing for the
emergence of a nonracial democracy. The recent freeing of some political
prisoners, however, encourages the hope that there will come a time in
South Africa when the hand of state racism lifts somewhat, and a space
for popular pressure and for reform grows. It may be difficult to recognize
that time - as it may have been difficult to know in 1954 that segregation
in the United States was ripe for attack. It may also be difficult, even when
this space opens up, for those opposed to apartheid to challenge the
well-organized, perhaps even violent, forces opposed to change - even
more difficult than such efforts were in the most challenging moments of
the American civil rights struggle.
When that time comes an independent and sympathetic judiciary may
play a role much greater than the role the South African courts have
played in years past. The government may find it convenient to place
responsibility for some changes largely in the hands of the courts - as the
United States in a sense did in the struggle over school desegregation.
(The adoption of a Bill of Rights might be one expression of such a
strategy.) Moreover, the process of change may have a momentum that
encourages courts to go considerably further than the government might
desire. The more legitimate the popular struggle for democracy becomes,
the more reluctant courts may be to approve the use of law for its
suppression.

39

But to have an independent and sympathetic judiciary for this difficult
39 The willingness of Van der Walt J to 'tak[e] into account the conditions in Alexandra ... [and] the
amount of perceived provocation of the residents in Alexandra because of what they subjectively saw
as unwarranted police action' in acquitting Moses Mayekiso and others of sedition exemplifies this
potential. S v Mayekiso WLD 5 May 1989 Case No 115/89, unreported, typed judgment at 55. The
duty to hear the other -side may already compel judges to hear much more extensive and vivid
explanations of blacks' struggles than other whites encounter. The more legitimate this struggle
becomes, in addition, the more judges may welcome such evidence even if they are not compelled to
do so.
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but welcome future argues for, if indeed it does not require, insisting on
such a judiciary now. If lawyers in South Africa do not press for decent
decisions, and do not struggle to sustain and expand the positive elements
of South African law, that law will grow worse. If liberal judges in South
Africa were to resign, there would be, as Mureinik has pointed out, no

sympathetic judges available to turn to. 4° If South African legal scholars
abandon a criticism of their courts that asserts that the courts, now,
should do better than they do, it may be harder to make the case for
positive judicial intervention when that intervention would be most
far-reaching. The pressure of emergency litigation is only a part of this

insistence on justice, but it is a part. On this score too, therefore, the
practice of emergency law may be valuable to the broader political
challenge to apartheid.

In sum, political considerations do not call for abandonment of the
practice of emergency law despite its benefits to individual clients.
Properly handled, lawyer's challenges to the emergency should not

undercut political efforts. Their work can help move South Africa
forward rather than restore moral force to the system of the past.
III. CONCLUSION
By now, however, we are obviously discussing the effects of antiapartheid legal work in general, rather than the unique merits of
emergency law practice. Even if lawyers opposed to apartheid can
fruitfully express that conviction in their legal practice, it would not
automatically follow that they should do so in the particular field of the
emergency. 41 After all, the courts have been less receptive to emergency
law claims than they are to the claims that South Africa's oppressed
people have brought in a variety of other contexts. While the courts'

40 Mureinik's point is quoted in J Dugard 'Should Judges Resign? .. .A Reply to Professor Wacks'
(1984) 101 SALI 286 at 294.
41 Indeed, it would not necessarily follow that anti-apartheid lawyers should devote all or most of their
professional lives to lawyering against apartheid. It is no doubt true, in South Africa as in the United
States, that lawyers can profoundly assist the cause of human rights in part-time efforts that are in a
sense ancillary to a nonpolitical career. Lawyers who practise in seemingly nonpolitical fields such as
corporate law may also find opportunities to counsel their powerful clients about those clients'
broader political or moral obligations. Even lawyers whose professional careers are wholly apolitical
may find ways to express their convictions in other parts of their lives.
In a society tainted only by 'moderate' levels of injustice, consideration for the autonomy of
individual human beings who become lawyers may lead to the conclusion that choices not to address
injustice through one's practice as a lawyer should be altogether beyond reproach. I think it is fair to
say that, in a society so riven by injustice as South Africa's, decisions not to become closely engaged
in the effort to correct that injustice are more troublesome than they would be in less anguished lands.
Such decisions by lawyers, whose selection of a career entails at least involvement in the world of
affairs and arguably some special responsibility for the assurance of justice, seem particularly
problematic. 'Close engagement' can certainly be found in work that is by no means full-time - the
South African bar offers outstanding examples of such part-time, yet intense, involvement - but at
some point on the spectrum a lawyer's separation from the fray does seem to pose a moral question.
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unresponsiveness may also mean that any risk of lending legitimacy to
South Africa's institutions is also reduced, it is easy to understand why
lawyers might wish to practise in fields where more could be achieved.
If the arguments I have made about emergency law can broadly be
generalized to other fields of legal challenge to apartheid, then it would
follow that legal efforts on many different fronts are valuable (and so I
believe). I can offer no criterion by which to judge the exact balance of
emergency law and other forms of work that would be ideal. Even if I
thought it possible to argue convincingly that greater emphasis on
emergency cases was appropriate, I would not want to suggest that
lawyers practising anti-apartheid law . . . a group facing difficulties
enough as it is ... should discount the sense of satisfaction that other
areas of this practice may give them.
I do want to argue, however, that it is important that emergency law
work continues even though other fields of law may offer more frequent
victories. I doubt that this proposition is a controversial one, but it may
be worth brief discussion nonetheless. One reason for maintaining this
practice is a moral proposition: such profound breaches of human rights
should not be left unopposed. Were lawyers' efforts against them wholly
ineffective, the need to express opposition to such injustice would
remain. But there is also a much more practical reason. The fact is that the
emergency has been the cutting edge of the South African government's
effort to control the rise of effective black opposition to apartheid. Even
now this edge is still sharp. The direct victims of the emergency are likely
to be those individuals and those organizations who are in the forefront
of the effort to bring change to South Africa. Protecting the people who
have taken up such roles is important morally; preserving space for them
and the organizations of which they are a part is important to the course
of political events as well. That course is often bleak and hard to predict,
but can hardly be abandoned.
South African lawyers are pressing the claims of the oppressed, both
those in detention and those suffering only the injustices of normal South
African life. Often this work must be deeply frustrating - perhaps even
more frustrating than the efforts of the lawyers involved in the first steps
of the struggle against racial segregation in the United States, decades
before Brown v Board of Education.42 But the decades of legal work and
popular struggle here did bear fruit. Looking back, we can say that the
potential - not the guarantee, but the potential - for that victory was
always present in the little-used constitutional mandate of equal
treatment for blacks. With this perspective in mind, we can similarly value
the intellectual and moral potential still inherent in South African law,
and the prizes to be won by pressing, at the bar, on the bench, in the
academy, and in the dock, for that potential to be realized.

42 347 US 483 (1954).

